BANGKOK, THAILAND – So‑called mule bank accounts rapidly became a central tool for professional scam syndicates in Thailand, prompting an intensive response from police and financial regulators.
New wave of corporate, victim and ‘spy’ accounts
According to a source at the Anti Online Scam Operation Center (AOC), three types of mule accounts were currently viewed as especially critical: corporate mule accounts, fake mule accounts and spy mule accounts. The source said the most dangerous development was the rise of corporate mule accounts, business accounts opened or purchased specifically for fraud, which had become more common over roughly the past year and marked a clear escalation in methods.
In this model, criminals established or acquired formally registered companies or partnerships solely to open bank accounts in the company’s name. The corporate shell created the appearance of a legitimate business partner, while the accounts were in fact used to channel fraud proceeds and conduct money laundering.
Victims turned into unwilling money couriers
A second critical category, described as fake mule accounts, consisted of accounts belonging to fraud victims who had lost all their money or could no longer service their debts. According to the AOC, these individuals were influenced through deception, psychological pressure or threats to accept and pass on funds from other fraud cases.
Often they did not realise they had become the first link in a money‑laundering chain and were effectively serving as the front line of the mule‑account infrastructure.
Undercover ‘spy’ accounts lead to arrests
The third type, so‑called spy mule accounts, had largely been kept confidential since the middle of the previous year. According to the AOC source, undercover police officers opened bank accounts at commercial banks and offered them for sale on online black markets.
Once crime syndicates used these accounts, investigators tracked entire fraud and money‑laundering networks back to their command centres. Similar to covert drug investigations, these accounts remained under full police control and had already led to numerous arrests.
Five-colour risk scale for mule accounts
The Bank of Thailand classified mule accounts in a five‑tier risk system known as the “Five‑Colour Horses.” Black mules represented the highest risk, with money‑laundering evidence confirmed by the Anti‑Money Laundering Office (Amlo), while dark grey mules were reported cases in which banks were allowed to freeze funds without a court order.
Light grey mules were conspicuous accounts monitored until complaints were filed, dark brown mules showed suspicious transfer patterns, and light brown mules were early fraud indicators that were closely monitored across the national financial system.
Nearly 2,000 cases and tough penalties
Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop Bhuridej, deputy national police chief and head of the AOC, told the Bangkok Post that between 27 October of the previous year and 21 January, police had handled 1,964 cases and arrested 1,870 suspects linked to mule accounts. Selling or renting out a bank account was an offence punishable by up to three years in prison, a fine of 300,000 baht, or both.
Those who recruited people for mule accounts or advertised such services faced two to five years in prison and fines ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 baht.
‘Detect–Freeze–Expand’ strategy with banks
According to Jirabhop, the Royal Thai Police (RTP) worked closely with the Bank of Thailand, the Thai Bankers’ Association, commercial banks and state agencies under a strategy labelled “Detect–Freeze–Expand.” The first pillar was real‑time monitoring, with police and banks sharing risk data through a central Central Fraud Registry.
Suspicious transactions, such as immediate cash withdrawals following incoming transfers in high‑risk areas, triggered instant alerts.
AI analytics and a national ‘war room’
In a second step, data analytics and AI tools were used to detect mule‑account patterns at an early stage and prevent financial damage. The third pillar was an inter‑agency “war room” coordinating with local police stations and bank branches.
In the event of suspicious activity, transfers or cash withdrawals were to be halted immediately, a practice that had already secured substantial sums for victims, according to Jirabhop.
Learning from Singapore while preserving instant payments
Thailand was closely following Singapore’s model to disrupt mule networks, Jirabhop said. Measures under discussion included transfer delays for high‑risk transactions and a “kill switch” that would allow citizens to freeze their own accounts instantly in an emergency.
However, the country’s payment infrastructure relied heavily on real‑time transactions as a key pillar of the digital economy, so any adjustments would need to avoid placing disproportionate burdens on businesses and everyday users.
Stricter KYC slows new mule accounts
“We are talking with the Bank of Thailand and commercial banks about targeted fraud rules or selective hurdles for high‑risk accounts, such as transfer delays or stricter checks before large transactions,”
said Jirabhop, referring to ongoing talks with the financial sector.
He said new mule‑account openings had already declined in the final quarter of the previous year thanks to tougher know‑your‑customer (KYC) checks. Lists of offenders and associated accounts were being sent to Amlo to classify them as particularly risky black mules, triggering immediate nationwide restrictions, though corporate mule accounts linked to shell companies remained one of the biggest challenges.
“Our goal is not only to close accounts after the crime, but to permanently break the incentive cycle,”
said Jirabhop.
Division of labour inside call-centre gangs
The AOC said it had analysed the structure of call‑centre gangs in detail and identified a clear division of labour designed to complicate investigations. The first group, described as the “deception group,” was responsible for psychological manipulation and persuaded victims to transfer money.
These units were often based in Cambodia, run by Chinese controllers and operated like call‑centre offices, working with prepared scripts and systematic training.
Money-laundering unit moves funds out fast
Staff were trained in phone and chat communication before they contacted victims and coordinated with the financial unit when a transfer was imminent. The second group was the money‑laundering unit.
“Their core task is to receive funds, move them and pull them out of the system as quickly as possible,”
said Jirabhop, adding that members received commissions of 10 to 20 percent but first had to lodge security deposits of 3 to 5 million baht to gain the organisers’ trust.