BANGKOK, THAILAND – Armed clashes on the Thai-Cambodian border have put years of diplomacy at risk and frozen key agreements meant to manage relations between the two neighbours, a Thai political analyst warned.
Border agreements and joint commission in jeopardy
Recent fighting between Thailand and Cambodia threatened to unravel Memoranda of Understanding signed in 2000 and 2001 that had framed border management. Political scientist Surachart Bamrungsuk said the legal foundation underpinning bilateral cooperation was now eroding, with no need for a referendum to declare the deals defunct. Progress on at least five unresolved border issues, including Nong Jan and Nong Nha Kaeo, had stalled, and plans for the Joint Boundary Commission to resume surveys early next year had effectively been derailed.
Border crossing reopenings, cross-border trade, goods transit and the return of Cambodian migrant workers had all receded into the distance without a clear path forward. Local communities on both sides risked losing their livelihoods as long-standing economic interdependence along the frontier was disrupted.
Military limits and unclear war aims
Surachart argued that Thailand’s reliance on bilateral mechanisms to manage border disputes had become unrealistic as external actors and geopolitics increasingly shaped the conflict. He dismissed as dangerous the assumption that Thailand’s superior firepower could decisively defeat Cambodia, noting that Cambodia’s military capabilities had expanded significantly since border clashes in 2011. Even a battlefield victory would not guarantee political submission in Phnom Penh, he said, warning Thai leaders against overestimating the power of coercion.
“Thailand is not Russia or Israel and cannot expect to employ overwhelming force without political and diplomatic consequences.”
said Surachart, a Thai political scientist.
He urged the government to clearly define the political objectives of any military action. Without a coherent strategy, he warned, the use of force risked drifting away from any meaningful political end-state and becoming an end in itself. Of the four pillars of national power – diplomacy, economy, military and information – Thailand’s advantage lay almost exclusively in the military realm, raising doubts about whether it had real levers over Cambodia.
Economic vulnerability and U.S. trade pressure
Surachart highlighted that Cambodia had substantial room to challenge Thailand in diplomatic forums and global information spaces. Thailand’s economic leverage, by contrast, was not structurally designed to exert coercive pressure in the current conflict and was therefore of limited strategic use. Thailand’s export dependence could not simply be shifted to China, he said, while communication with the U.S. Trade Representative remained blocked.
A loss of access to the American market in a period of heightened geopolitical tension would pose a serious economic threat to Thailand. The current Trump administration had shown it was willing to use trade sanctions as a tool of pressure, and Surachart warned Thailand could not afford to enter a trade confrontation with the United States while simultaneously pursuing a border war.
Global media narrative turns against Thailand
In international coverage, images of Thai airstrikes had become the dominant visuals shaping global perceptions of the conflict. This narrative diverged sharply from Thailand’s self-image, which assumed the international community would largely see the dispute through Bangkok’s lens. Surachart cautioned that the prominence of military imagery could severely damage Thailand’s reputation abroad.
Thailand’s diplomatic credibility suffered as war scenes overshadowed its messages, he said, while Cambodia increasingly presented itself as a victim and foregrounded humanitarian themes. International media reports about civilian casualties and potential war crimes further undermined Thailand’s campaign, creating what Surachart described as a narrative asymmetry that could have longer-term consequences than any single operation.
Limited payoff from international forums
Surachart also warned against overestimating the value of the Ottawa Convention conference, where Thailand believed it had Cambodia on the defensive. Thailand could present its case there, he noted, but the forum could not issue binding decisions and negotiations would take time. Cambodia had already rejected Thailand’s claims, and any conclusions reached would have no legal force.
By contrast, he said, the more consequential venue was the UN Security Council, where Cambodia might seek international intervention or a review of Thailand’s military actions. Surachart cautioned that a foreign policy course that alienated both the United States and ASEAN would be especially risky, particularly if Thailand signalled it was ending negotiations with Cambodia.
Risk of isolation from ASEAN and partners
Declaring an end to talks would make Thailand appear unwilling to pursue peaceful solutions, Surachart said, leaving only the image of military force. That stance carried significant political risks and could isolate the country within the international community as criticism from foreign partners intensified. He warned that a path focused solely on military solutions ran counter to ASEAN’s traditional emphasis on “peaceful settlement mechanisms.”
ASEAN’s solidarity and regional stability were at stake, with a bilateral Thailand–Cambodia conflict potentially putting pressure on the entire organisation. Thailand had historically played an important role in ASEAN, but insisting on military options threatened to clash with the bloc’s norms and could reshape the regional security architecture over the long term.
Nationalism, elections and democratic strain
Surachart described rising nationalism and militarism as a dangerous instrument serving short-term political interests while weakening Thailand’s long-term strategic position. Nationalist sentiment could be easily inflamed but would be harder to contain once political conditions returned to normal. In such a climate, public opinion might view any negotiated settlement as a betrayal.
He said escalating tensions raised questions about Thailand’s political timetable, including speculation over a possible dissolution of Parliament. If elections were held under wartime conditions, nationalist rhetoric would dominate all campaigns, marginalising dissenting voices. The contested MoUs at the heart of the dispute would be politically difficult to defend, and democratic practice itself would suffer.
Migrants, trade disruption and long-term security
Surachart pointed to growing humanitarian pressures, with hundreds of Cambodians carrying their belongings and waiting at border crossings, turning the situation into a burgeoning crisis. Border clashes threatened not only diplomatic ties but also the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers. A mass return of migrants could destabilise Cambodia and raise urgent questions in Thailand about responsibility for the humanitarian fallout.
Trade between Thailand and Cambodia had long been a pillar of regional stability, he said, but the closure of crossings and disruption of trade routes were tearing apart this economic network. The prolonged conflict risked hitting Thailand harder than Cambodia because of its greater export dependence. Even if Thailand won militarily, Surachart warned, it would leave behind a generation of Cambodians hostile to the country, embedding security risks in the form of tense border patrols, terrorism and chronic instability.
“There is no military way out of this dilemma – only the difficult but unavoidable return to the negotiating table.”
said Surachart, calling for a renewed diplomatic track.
He stressed that geography meant Thailand and Cambodia had to live side by side and could not escape one another. Strategic thinking, he argued, required accepting that permanent neighbours needed lasting peace, and any strategy built solely on military dominance was doomed to fail and to produce further decades of conflict and mistrust.