BANGKOK, THAILAND – Thailand’s Election Commission rejected claims that QR and barcodes on ballot papers violated constitutionally guaranteed ballot secrecy, describing them as tools to combat fraud.
Party concerns over secret ballot
The Pheu-Thai Party publicly questioned on 13 February whether QR and barcodes on ballot papers were compatible with the principle of the secret ballot and raised potential constitutional issues. The dispute, which followed the 8 February vote, triggered a wider debate over transparency and the integrity of the electoral process.
The Election Commission (EC) countered that the markings served solely to prevent forgery and could not be used to link an individual ballot to a specific voter.
EC cites legal basis and anti-fraud purpose
At a press conference on 13 February at 5:25 p.m., senior EC officials Korrasit Charoen-in, Sub Lt Pasakorn Siripakayaporn, Kittipol Payakkhadejaphan and Worapong Ananchareonkit said the codes were authorised under EC Regulation No. 129. Worapong explained that the commission was empowered in special cases to print codes, symbols or text on ballot papers without prior notice in order to prevent forgery and so-called “ballot inflation”.
“The codes are covered by EC Regulation No. 129 and are used to prevent forgery and ballot inflation, not to track individual voters.”
said Worapong Ananchareonkit, EC representative.
How QR and barcodes are used
According to the EC, the QR and barcodes were used during printing to capture data and monitor the total number of ballot papers produced, helping to avoid overprinting and manipulation during binding and packaging, with each booklet containing 20 ballot papers. The system also allowed tracking of distribution to polling station committees and district election directors, so that if a ballot surfaced outside the authorised process, at least the relevant electoral district could be identified.
“The codes help us control production and distribution of ballot papers, but they do not connect to any personal data of voters.”
said Worapong Ananchareonkit, EC representative.
No link to individual voters, EC insists
Worapong stressed that the codes were not linked to personal data and could not reveal which party or candidate any individual had supported. Even if images of ballot papers circulated, the EC maintained that no conclusions could be drawn about a specific voter’s choice.
When asked whether a scanned barcode with a unique number could in theory be connected to signed ballot stubs, Worapong said this was not possible in practice because of multiple layers of safeguards. He also pointed out that unauthorised opening of ballot boxes was a criminal offence and therefore another barrier to any unlawful tracing.
Social media images under investigation
The commission acknowledged that photos of sections of ballot papers had appeared on social media and that barcodes there could indicate the code of the relevant polling station. However, these ballots were still attached to booklets at polling stations, remained under the responsibility of the competent officials and were now being examined as part of ongoing investigations.
Sub Lt Pasakorn Siripakayaporn said that ballot stubs, marked ballot papers and voter lists were strictly separated and stored under high security, so that the 8 February election could not be traced back to individuals. Vote counting took place in public, with observers and party representatives present, and ballots were sorted into valid, invalid and “no vote” categories before being securely stored.
Different ballot types and earlier votes
The EC stated that three types of ballot papers had been used for the election and the referendum, produced under time pressure in three printing houses with different security features. For referendum ballots, no QR or barcodes were used, but separate, undisclosed tracking systems were in place.
The commission recalled that QR codes had already been used in constituency ballots in the 2023 election, and that ballot images shared online were either still attached to booklets at polling stations or taken during the count, without voters themselves being responsible.
Pheu Thai flags possible legal action
Pheu Thai had previously warned that a potential link between barcodes and signed stubs could violate ballot secrecy and serve as a basis for legal action. The party set up a working group and pointed to a possible case via the Ombudsman to the Constitutional Court.